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INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIERS-PSYCHIC
INJURY AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION
In Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,' the New York Court of Appeals held that article 17 of the Warsaw Convention2 limits recovery for
personal injuries to objective bodily injury caused by psychic trauma,
physical circumstances, or physical impact, and thus, prohibits recovery
for psychic trauma alone.
This action consolidated two cases3 involving essentially identical facts.
The majority of the plaintiffs were passengers on defendant's flight from
Tel Aviv, Israel to New York City, when, on September 6, 1970, the plane
was hijacked by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and flown to Amman, Jordan. There the hijackers, armed with rifles
and grenades, forced the passengers to remain on or near the aircraft for
six days. On September 12, the passengers were transferred from the plane
to a bus where they witnessed the plane being destroyed by explosives. The
passengers were returned to New York the next day. The plaintiffpassengers, all Jewish, in bringing this action against defendant, Trans
World Airlines, alleged they had suffered severe psychic trauma throughout the ordeal, fearing for their lives and personal safety. Plaintiffs also
claimed to have suffered from physical injuries caused by forced confinement in their seats, extreme temperatures of the desert, and lack of an
adequate food and water supply.
Moving for summary judgment, the plaintiffs asserted that under the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention and the subsequent Montreal
Agreement,' the defendant was absolutely liable for their psychic and
physical injuries resulting from the hijacking. The trial court 5 directed
summary judgment for the plaintiffs in both cases, but the appellate division 6 reversed, finding triable issues of fact as to the interpretation of the
1. 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention), July 31, 1934, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018 (1934), T.S. No. 876
(effective October 12, 1929). The Convention imposes liability on international air carriers
for passenger injuries.
3. Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2d Dept. 1972)
and Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (lst Dept. 1972).
4. Montreal Agreement, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), 44 C.A.B. REP. 819
(1966). See C.A.B. Order No. 18900 approving the Agreement May 13, 1966. See also Warsaw
Convention, art. 20(1), 49 Stat. 3019 (1934), T.S. No. 876 which provides:
The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them
to take such measures.
5. Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct.,
(Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Kings County 1972); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Doc. No. County 1971).
6. Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2d Dept. 1972)
and Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dept. 1972).
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"French legal meaning" of certain critical phrases in article 17 of the
Convention. However, the court of appeals reversed the order of the appellate division and explained that the "precise meaning" of article 17 of the
Convention must be treated by the court as a question of law.7
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, concerning the liability of international air carriers for passenger injuries, provides in part: "The carrier shall
be liable for damages sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger. . . . ,, Unfortunately, the records of the Warsaw meetings of 1929, and preparatory
meetings from 1925-1929, fail to show whether the drafters meant for "bodily injury" to encompass psychic trauma standing alone and unconnected
to any physical injury.'
American courts are divided on the question. In Burnett v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., i"decided prior to and cited in Rosman, the District Court
of New Mexico dealt with an action based upon the same factual situation
as Rosman. The Burnett court adopted the view that the "French legal
meaning" of the term in article 17 prevails and hence, the issue of whether
damages for psychic trauma alone are recoverable is to be found from a
review of French legal history." The main argument advanced by courts
following this interpretation is that under article 36,12 the original and
official draft is written in French and that the phrase "mort, de blessure
ou de toute autre lesion corporelle" connotes only "an infringement of
physical integrity;"' 3 therefore, the "French legal meaning" does not con7. 34 N.Y.2d at 392, 314 N.E.2d at 852, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 103. In support of its decision,
the court in Rosman noted that
[wihile the treaty is written in French, it is nevertheless a domestic, not a foreign
law. It is the supreme law of the land of which New York courts are required to
take judicial notice.
Id.
8. Warsaw Convention, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018 (1934), T.S. No. 876 (emphasis added).
9. See Lowenfield, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic Trauma, 1 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 345, 347 (1973); II Conference Int'l de Droit Prive Aerien, 4-12 (Oct. 1929).
See also pp. 52, 111-12, 135-36, 163-65, Comite Int'l Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens,
Compte-Rendu, lst-4th Sess. (1926-29) and pp. 47, 113, 3d Sess. (1928).
10. 368 F.Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
11. Id. at 1155. See Tokok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 454, 50 S.Ct. 363, 365, 74
L.Ed. 956, 960 (1930). (When the text of a treaty is drawn up in only one language, that
language is controlling; moreover, treaties should be given a liberal interpretation to give
effect to their apparent purpose.) See also Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d
323, 330 (5th Cir. 1967).
12. Warsaw Convention, art. 36, 49 Stat. 3022 (1934), T.S. No. 876 provides:
This convention is drawn up in French in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland and of which one
duly certified copy shall be sent by the Polish Government to the Government of
each of the High Contracting Parties.
13. See A. COLIN AND H. CAPITANT, TRAITE DE DRorT CIVIL, 605 (revised by J. de la Morandiere, 1959), cited in Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F.Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.N.M.
1973). The court in Burnett noted that the original draft tended to allow recovery for psychic

1976]

NOTES

note inclusion of mental injury. In contrast to Burnett, is Husseri v. Swiss
Air Transport Co., 4 decided subsequent to Rosman. Husseri, a federal
court case in the Southern District of New York, arose out of the same
hijacking as that in Rosman. The court in Husseri determined that a treaty
is the supreme law of the land and therefore, the Warsaw Convention
should be treated as part of the United States law to be interpreted in light
of and according to federal law."
The American courts are further split as to whether local 6 or federal"
law should apply in determining if damages for psychic trauma standing
alone are recoverable under the Convention. 8 The Husserl court adopted
trauma alone but was amended in a later draft to restrict recovery to bodily injuries, thus
inferring the intention of the drafters to exclude recovery for mental injuries. 368 F.Supp. at
1156-57.
14. 388 F.Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386
F.2d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 1967) where the court reaches a compromise between the two opposing
views by stating that the "French legal meaning" must prevail, but that the Convention's
terms should be interpreted broadly, suggesting that an acceptable American view could be
derived from the "French legal meaning."
15. 388 F.Supp. It 1249. See Lowenfield, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic
Trauma, 1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. at 345-48 (1973) where it is noted that the French
have had as much trouble as the United States in deciding whether psychic trauma, standing
alone, is grounds for recovery.
See also Kreindler, An Appraisal From a Plaintiff's Viewpoint of Tort Liability Arising
From Aircraft Hijacking, 1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 327, 329-30 (1973). After discussing
the trial court's finding in Herman v. Trans World Airlines, 69 Misc.2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d
829 (1971) that the French legal meaning must prevail, Kreindler concludes:
If this decision is not reversed by the Court of Appeals, it is interesting to speculate
about what a Kings County jury, interpreting the Warsaw Convention and considering proof of what a few French words mean, is going to come up with.
Id. at 330.
16. See Lowenfield, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic Trauma, 1 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. at 349-50 (1973) and Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw
Convention, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 323 (1959). But see Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
34 N.Y.2d at 398, 314 N.E.2d at 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 108 where the court stated:
The application of local law would impress an artifical sense upon the terms which
finds no warrant in the treaty and such a course would surely be a deviation from
the principles of treaty construction.
17. See Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 699 (2d Cir. 1957) where the
court stated:
[Tihe law to be applied in this case is not state law but a federal treaty. It is
applied in the state courts not because it expresses a state policy which a federal
court must follow, but because it expresses federal policy which a state court must
follow.
See also Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971); Husserl v.
Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F.Supp. 1238, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp.,
27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1970); Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15
N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964); Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
40 A.D.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1972)(dissenting opinion); Herzog, Kreindler, et al., Panel
Discussion:Lawyers, Liability, and Recovery, 1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 353, 356 (1973).
18. The American courts are also divided as to whether the interpretation of any international treaty entered into by the United States is a matter of law rather than one of fact.
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the more accepted view, stating that since the Warsaw Convention is part
of federal law, it should be interpreted accordingly."9 Furthermore, the
court reasoned that two purposes of the Convention-to limit an international air carrier's liability and to facilitate recovery by injured passengers-could best be served by expansively construing the types of injury
for which a plaintiff may recover. 0 Specifically rejecting the holding in
Rosman, the Husserl court noted the recent developments in physiology
and psychology relating the mind as part of the body."' Using a "purpose
and intent" analysis, the Husserl court thus deduced that the drafters
meant the Convention to include recovery for psychic trauma unaccompanied by physical injuries. 2
In Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,23 the court, after noting that
the Warsaw Convention does not itself create a cause of action, but merely
sets limits or conditions on recovery,2' rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the meaning of "wounding" and "bodily injury" is to be determined
by local law. 5 The court skirted the issue of whether the French or English
interpretation of "bodily injury" (lesion corporelle) prevailed by ruling
that the meaning would be the same under either language.
The Rosman court based its decision on what it found to be the "ordiProfessor Herzog's view supports the Rosman court's decision that the interpretation of any
international treaty validly entered into by the United States is a matter of law, not a matter
of fact, regardless of the language in which it was written. Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 26
SYRACUSE L. REv. 16, 17 (1975). See also Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d at
392, 314 N.E.2d at 852, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (1974).
19. 388 F.Supp. at 1249.
20. Id. at 1247.
21. Id. at 1250.
22. The Husserl court made the following findings regarding the Warsaw Convention:
(1) Drafters did not consider the mental injury issue; (2) Drafters did not exclude
any particular types of injuries; (3) Drafters attempted to make the Warsaw Convention comprehensive to cover all the types of injuries recoverable; (4) Shouldn't
restrict coverage of Convention because drafters neglected to address the psychic
trauma issue; and, (5) To effect the treaty's avowed purpose, the types of injuries
enumerated should be construed expansively to encompass as many types of injury
as are colorably within the ambit of the enumerated types. Mental and psychosomatic injuries are colorably within that ambit and are, therefore, comprehended by
article 17.
Id. at 1250.
23. 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
24. Id. at 398-99, 314 N.E.2d at 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 108-09. See also Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F.Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d
436, 438 (2d Cir. 1953)(claim for damages under article 17 arises in the event of bodily injury).
25. 34 N.Y.2d at 397, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107. The plaintiffs contended
that the Rosman court should be guided by the New York state court decision, Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), which recognized a right in
negligence cases to recover for mere psychic injury standing alone. However, the issue in
Rosman was whether the Convention's drafters contemplated recovery for this particular type
of injury.
26. 34 N.Y.2d at 393L94, 314 N.E.2d at 852-53, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 103-05.
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nary and natural" meaning of the terms of article 17.7 The court stated:
[11n its ordinary usage, the term "bodily" suggests opposition to
"mental". . . . [TIherefore, the ordinary, natural meaning of "bodily
injury" as used in article 17 connotes palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and excludes mental injury with no observable "bodily" as distinquished from "behavioral" manifestations.21
The court further noted that in addition to proving injury of an objective
and identifiable nature, a plaintiff must also rest his recovery upon showing a causal connection between the bodily injury and the hijacking. 9 This
causal connection is completed if an intermediate mental link is between
the cause (the hijacking) and the effect (the "bodily injury"). 0 Therefore,
the Rosman court concluded that where "objective bodily injury" has resulted from psychic trauma, which in turn was induced by an event such
as hijacking, then the damages, both mental and physical, sustained as a
result of the "bodily injury" are compensable. 3'
Judge Stevens, dissenting in Rosman, concluded that the Warsaw Convention held international air carriers liable for injuries resulting from
objective physical impact or contact but not for mental injuries.32 After
reviewing the background of the Warsaw Convention, the dissent viewed
the liability issue in light of the time in which the Convention was drafted,
much as the majority did. 33 However, Judge Stevens felt the search for
liability should be restricted to types of injury that were generally cognizable at the time of the writing. He thus determined that "psychic trauma"
was not embraced within the term "bodily injury" at the time of the
drafting and hence cannot be deemed to be a recoverable element under
the Warsaw Convention.3 4 To prevent this conclusion, he suggested that
27. Id. at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
28. Id. at 396-97, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107. In Rosman, the court also
pointed out that
[w]e deal with a term as used . . .almost 50 years ago, a term which even today
would have little significance in the treaty as an adjective modifying "injury"
except to import a distinction from "mental."

Id.
29. Id. at 399, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
30. Id. at 399, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109. On this point, the court cited with
approval, Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F.Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973) in which mental
anguish and emotional distress directly resulting from physical injuries suffered in hijacking
were found to be compensable in an action under article 17. 34 N.Y.2d at 400, 314 N.E.2d at
1857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109, n. 12.
31. 34 N.Y.2d at 399, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
32. Id. at 401, 314 N.E.2d at 858, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
33. Id. at 403, 314 N.E.2d at 859, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 112. See Valentine v. United States,
299 U.S. 5, 10, 57 S.Ct. 100, 103, 81 L.Ed. 5, 9 (1936) where the court observed: "It is a familiar
rule that the obligations of treaties should be liberally construed so as to give effect to the
apparent intention of the parties."
34. 34 N.Y.2d at 403, 314 N.E.2d at 859, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
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either the agreement could be amended to include compensation for
psychic trauma, or the member nations could create a mutual fund out of
which hijacking victims could be compensated."
The Rosman court, presented with an opportunity to determine whether
psychic trauma is recoverable under the Warsaw Convention without accompanying injury, viewed the treaty solely as of the time it was drafted.
In marked contrast to Husserl, the Rosman court limited its consideration
to the following criteria: (1) the drafter's intentions;36 (2) the "ordinary and
natural meaning" of the terms;3" and (3) the purpose of the Convention,
as promoting uniformity among its members.3" The Husserl court, using a
more practical "purpose and intent" analysis, looked beyond the date of
drafting in 1929 to the recent developments in psychology which no longer
make the traditional distinction between "mind" and "body. '3 Although
the Convention had two major purposes, the Rosman court emphasized
only one-"uniformity among its diverse members."'" However, the
Husserl court looked also to the second purpose-facilitating recovery by
injured passengers"-and thus determined that the purpose of the Convention could best be served by expansively construing the types of injury
for which a plaintiff may recover." The aviation industry of 1975 is a far
cry from what existed in 1929, and the Rosman court, in contrast to the
Husserl court, failed to take cognizance that an interpretation, valid 50
years ago, may bring an injustice today."
It should be noted that the proposed Guatemala Protocol of 1971, signed
by 21 countries but not yet in effect, would amend the Warsaw Convention
to change the critical terms of article 17 dealing with personal injuries of
Id. at 403, 314 N.E.2d at 859, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 859, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
Id. at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 854, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106, quoting from RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (SECOND) 146 (1965) which states:
[Tihe object, in interpreting an international treaty is "to ascertain the meaning
sintended by the parties for the terms in which the agreement is expressed, having
regard to the context in which they occur and the circumstances under which the
agreement was made."
37. 34 N.Y.2d at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 854, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
38. Id. In Herzog, Kreindler, et al., Panel Discussion:Lawyers, Liability, and Recovery,
1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 353 (1973) it is noted that
[tihe purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to promote uniformity of law, The
United States should adhere to this policy rather than having potential [sic] fifty
different results from the fifty states. This result would undercut the reason of
having a multilateral convention.
Id. at 357.
39. 388 F.Supp. at 1238, 1250.
40. 34 N.Y.2d at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 854, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
41. 388 F. Supp. at 1247-50.
42. Id.
43. The Husserl court observed that the Convention was prompted by a desire to protect
an "infant" industry from "potentially destructive liability." 388 F.Supp. at 1244.
35.
36.
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passengers from "death or bodily injury" to "death or personal injury." ' 4
Changing the key terms "death or bodily injury" to "death or personal
injury" will surely result in another series of interpretations by the courts
concerning an international air carrier's liability for passenger injuries.
The Protocol, by limiting liability against the air carriers for injuries to
only innocent (non-negligent) passengers, may prompt the courts to allow
recovery for psychic trauma alone, since the air carriers would no longer
be absolutely liable as under the present Montreal Agreement.
JOSEPH WILLIAM BOONE
44. The proposed article IV of the Guatemala Protocol would change the wording of the
present article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to read as follows:
Article 17: 1. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or personal
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event which caused the death or
injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury
resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.
Guatemala Protocol, done March 8, 1971, DEP'T OF STATE BULL., vol. LXIV, No.
1661 (April 26, 1971) reproduced in 10 INT'L LEG. MAT'L. 613-16 (1971) (emphasis

added).
See Seagrave, An Airline's Appraisal of Tort Liability Arising from Aircraft Hijacking, 1
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 339, 341 (1973).

